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Abstract 
Humans have the unique ability to infer a rich tapestry of mental state information by 
observing other’s behavior. Moreover, recent work by Malle and Holbrook (2012) demonstrated 
that the ease and speed with which people make such mental state inferences is hierarchically 
organized. Inferences of intentionality are the fastest inferences people make followed by desire, 
belief, and lastly, personality. The present work seeks to replicate this hierarchy and extend it by 
examining whether social stereotypes facilitate or slow mental state inferences. Utilizing the 
Stereotype Content Model (SCM, Fiske et al., 2002), the present study aimed to determine 
whether perceived warmth and competence would moderate the speed which people make 
mental state inferences. Additionally, due to the primacy of warmth, we predicted that the effect 
of perceived warmth be larger than the effect of competence. The present study (n = 97), 
manipulated three fully-crossed, within-subject factors: inference type (intentionality, desire, 
belief, personality), warmth stereotype (high/low), and competence stereotype (high/low). The 
results largely replicated Malle and Holbrook’s (2012) hierarchical findings. Moreover, we show 
that the hierarchy is robust across levels of targets’ perceived warmth and competence, which 
showed no significant effects. Though SCM clusters were balanced in social desirability, it may 
be that behaviors matched with some stereotype groups better than others, thereby muting the 
effect of perceived warmth and competence. Future research should aim to account for the 
possible relationship between social desirability and warmth, so as not to support nor refute the 
schema of that agent’s social group. 
Keywords: social cognition, theory of mind, attribution, mental state inference, stereotype, 
warmth, competence 
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Stereotype Content: The Speed of Mental State Inferences 
Social cognition is a complex and multifaceted domain. Humans have an incredible 
ability to understand behavior not only through the observable physical motions of an action, but 
also the unobservable mental causes of behavior (desires, intentions, and beliefs). Moreover, 
humans use these mental state inferences to make predictions about others’ future behavior, 
desires, and goals. For example, when a surgeon reaches her hand out for a scalpel, her nurse 
easily infers that she wants the scalpel and reactively hands it to her. In this case, the nurse made 
inferences about the surgeon’s desire for an object simply from the dynamics of an intentional 
action (i.e., reaching). Additionally, the nurse could have made more complicated inferences, 
such as that the surgeon believes in the scalpel is the needed tool for this stage of the surgery, or, 
perhaps even that the surgeon has a detail-oriented personality to be successful at her profession. 
Since humans cannot directly read minds, the basis for understanding what another is thinking 
inferred indirectly from behavior observations and by pre-existing cognitive schemas.  
These schemas allow people to use pre-existing social group attributes, such as that 
surgeons are highly competent, to shape interpretation of behavior and infer mental states. In 
contrast to the surgeon, imagine a shaman of some sort attempting to heal a patient with rituals. 
At least in the West, people’s pre-existing stereotypes surrounding magic healing will inform 
perceptions of this shaman; namely, that this individual is incompetent as a healer. The mental 
states people infer about the shaman will reflect this perception as well as a multitude of other 
schematic information than is associated with such a person. Furthermore, there are different 
kinds of mental state inferences, some of which are more complex and take more time than 
others. We must turn to developmental psychology in order to fully examine the differences 
between these inferences. 
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Mental State Inferences 
From an extraordinarily young age, humans have the ability to infer mental state 
information from behavior. At six months of age, infants understand simple goals of others in 
ways that reflect adult goal-attribution (Woodward, 1998). By 18 months, children can 
understand an adult’s desire for a particular object (Moll & Tomasello, 2007), and by the 4 th 
year, children begin to understand others’ beliefs (e.g., “Where does Sally think the marble is?”) 
and that others’ beliefs can be different from their own (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001); and, 
by age 6 or 7, inferences about personality traits emerge (Kalish & Shiverick, 2004; Snodgrass, 
1976). For example, conversations are extremely complex interactions, yet, adults and even 
children intuitively understand rules of turn taking. A child waiting for a swing to open up infers 
that the other children want to swing just as much. Conversely, the children on the swings see the 
child waiting and infer that the child wants to swing and intends to take a swing when one opens 
up. 
Past research examining adult mental state inference focused on how people make inferences 
about specific mental states (e.g., intentionality, desire, belief, and trait) in isolation. Recently, 
however, Malle and Holbrook (2012) tested whether there is a hierarchy in the way people make 
inferences about others mind and character. Mirroring work from developmental psychology 
showing that children first understand intentionality, followed by desire, belief, and lastly 
personality (Woodward, 1998; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Wellman et al., 2001; Kalish & 
Shiverick, 2004; Snodgrass, 1976). Malle and Holbrook (2012) argue that the same hierarchy 
exists with regard to the speed with which adults are able to make mental state and personality 
inferences.  Specifically, Malle and Holbrook (2012) hypothesized that the following hierarchy 
exists in terms of likelihood and speed (fastest to slowest): intentionality, desire, belief, then 
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personality. In Studies 1 and 2, participants listened to a behavior and then responded to speeded 
yes/no questions asking if the behavior conveyed an intention, goal (desires), thought (beliefs), 
or personality trait. The reaction times to the probes were recorded. In terms of both likelihood 
and speed, the results showed intentionality and desire inferences to be equally fast, followed by 
belief inferences, and personality inferences were the slowest of the four. Study 3 replicated 
these results using video stimuli. Therefore, across multiple domains, these studies demonstrated 
that the complexity of the mental state inference increases the time it takes to be made. However, 
there are other factors besides the type of inference which also influence the overall speed. As 
aforementioned, social stereotypes play a role in inference making, but the relevant question is: 
which social factors reliably alter the speed the mental state inferences? 
Warmth and Competence 
In the cognitive economy of the human brain, time and energy can be saved through the 
generation and use of mental shortcuts. In a social context, stereotypes function as resource-
saving tools that allow general assumptions to be made about groups or kinds of people at face 
value. For example, stereotypes for certain groups, like doctors, are that they are intelligent 
caring individuals; by contrast, stereotypes for other groups, like drug addicts, are that they are 
cold and good-for-nothing (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Obviously, people make direct 
inferences about the mental states of others based on observed behavior; however, these 
inferences are also informed by other social factors such as group membership and stereotypes. 
For example, Ames (2004) demonstrated that participants who more closely identified with 
social groups (e.g., fraternity brother, medical school student, lawyer) lowered their use of 
stereotyping and interpreted mental states as more similar to their own (projection) when 
presented with ethically questionable behavior on the part of the social group member. 
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Fiske et al. (2002) were forerunners in modeling the systematicity that exists within the 
content of stereotypes. The Stereotype Content Model (SCM) uses two dimensions – warmth and 
competence – to map stereotypes. Functionally, warmth is related to the perceived intentions of 
an individual, whereas competence is related to the perceived ability of that individual to enact 
their intentions. For example, a medical doctor might be perceived as both having the morally-
positive intention of healing patients (high warmth) as well as the capability to accomplish this 
intention via successfully diagnosing and treating patients (high competence). On the other hand, 
a drug addict may be perceived as both having the morally-negative intention of pursuing drugs 
at all costs (low warmth) and an inability to satiate their pursuit (low competence). The SCM 
maintains cross-cultural and cross-demographic validity, verifying that the dimensions of 
warmth and competence hold up no matter which context it is presented in and no matter what 
age, gender, race/ethnicity, etc. is presented in the content (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; 
Fisk, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2012; Cambon, Yzerbyt, & 
Takimova, 2015). 
Hack, Goodwin, and Fiske (2013) argue that social perceptions of warmth and competence 
are evolutionarily significant because they allow humans to assess threats. Members of one’s in-
group (non-threats) are, by default, perceived as warm. Conversely, an out-group member, who 
in evolutionary terms could be a threat to oneself or one’s in-group, is perceived as low in 
warmth. In the past, predicting warmth from threat has been difficult, yielding statistically weak 
results (Clausell & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). However, Kervyn, Fiske, and 
Yzerbyt (2015) identified that the past SCM studies only examined limited aspects of threat 
(Aktan, 2013; Aktan & Sakallı-Ugurlu, 2013); and, utilized the Integrated Threat Theory 
(Stephan & Renfro, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 1998) to holistically predict 
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warmth from both realistic (e.g., political, economic) and symbolic (e.g., values, beliefs, 
worldviews) forms of intergroup threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 
1996; Stephan et al., 2002, 1998; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). The results indicated that 
integrated measurement better and more reliably predicted warmth than past, single-aspect 
approaches to threat. 
In line with the central importance of warmth, recent experiments demonstrate that warmth 
detection is faster compared to competence detection because of warmth’s function for assessing 
group membership (Wojciszke, 2005; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). In one series of studies, 
Ybarra et al., (2001) tested participants’ ability to distinguish words from non-words and found 
that warmth-related words were identified faster than competence-related words. In a similar 
vein, Hack et al. (2013) recruited all White participants and showed them photos of Black and 
White, male and female people. Each photo was paired with either a positive (caring) or negative 
(selfish) warmth-related word or a positive (clever) or negative (ignorant) competence-related 
word. The results showed that pairing White targets with positive warmth words was 
significantly faster than pairing Black targets with positive warmth-related words. 
The results of these studies align well with evolutionary theory in that it is adaptive to be able 
to quickly detect who is a friend and who is an enemy; faster processing is dedicated to the 
primary binary assessment: threat? yes or no, than the secondary fine tuning: how much of a 
threat? (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Warmth and Competence Processing. 
 
Theoretical Integration and Predictions 
The SCM’s measures of warmth and competence have been applied to many domains 
such as socioeconomic class division (Moya, Fiske, Durante, & Tablante, 2017), employer 
appeal (Drevs, Gebele, & Lindenmeier, 2015), age discrimination (Farnum & Wiener, 2016), and 
moderating placebo effects in the context of healthcare delivery (Howe, Goyer, & Crum, 2017).  
Previous research has examined some associations between the content of stereotypes (e.g., 
consistency, power) and spontaneous trait inferences (Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 
2003; Wang & Yang, 2017); additionally, the frequency of mental state referencing has been 
demonstrated to increase when conversing with an in-group member compared to an out-group 
member (McClung & Reicher, 2017). However, no research to date has specifically investigated 
the influence of stereotype content on the speed of mental state inferences. 
The present study aimed to determine whether perceived warmth and competence would 
moderate the speed which people make mental state inferences. Three key predictions guided our 
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study. First, in line with previous work by Malle & Holbrook (2012), we predicted a speed 
hierarchy of mental state inferences whereby people would make inferences of intentionality and 
desire most quickly, followed by belief inferences, and finally personality inferences. Second, we 
predicted perceived warmth would moderate mental state inference speed.  Specifically, we 
predicted that all mental state inferences would be speeded for targets stereotyped as being 
higher in warmth compared to targets stereotyped as being lower in warmth. Similarly, third, we 
predicted that mental state inference speed will be facilitated (i.e., faster) for targets perceived as 
high in competence compared to targets perceived as low in competence; however, due to the 
primacy of warmth (Ybarra et al., 2001; Todorov et al., 2005; Wojciszke, 2005; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Hack et al., 2013), we predict that the effect of 
perceived warmth be larger than the effect of competence. See Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2. Hypothesized Speed Hierarchy of Mental State Inferences for Each SCM Cluster. 
 
Study 1: Norming Data 
Methods 
Design  
 The purpose of this pretest was to identify stereotype groups that were perceived as 
clearly belonging to each of the warmth and competence clusters of the Stereotype Content 
Model. The warmth scales, competence scales, and most of the stereotype groups were the same 
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as those used originally by Fiske and colleagues (2002). However, we added some additional 
groups for balancing purposes (e.g., Atheists was added to balance Christians). In total, 44 
stereotype groups were used, with 11 in each cluster (see Table 1.)  
Table 1. 




 We recruited 226 college students (mean age = 20.11 years, SD = 2.93) from 
Appalachian State University, and compensated them with required credit for their psychology 
classes.  Of the total sample, 178 (78.4%) were female. The majority of the sample, 206 (90.7%) 
were White/Caucasian, 18 (7.9%) were Latin/Hispanic, 7 (3.1%) were African/African 
American, 7 (3.1%) were Native American, and 5 (2.2%) were Asian/Asian American. 
Participants were moderately religious (M = 3.10, SD = 1.30; 1 = not at all religious; 5 = very 
religious) and politically moderate (M = 3.76, SD = 1.62; 1 = very liberal; 7 = very conservative). 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the study online. Participants were presented with all 44 targets in 
a random order and responded to a five item warmth scale (e.g., 1 = Not warm at all; 5 = 
Extremely warm) and a five item competence scale (e.g., 1 = Not competent at all; 5 = Extremely 
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competent) for each target. Items in the warmth scale were how warm, tolerant, good-natured, 
sincere, and moral each target was, and items in the competence scale were how competent, 
confident, independent, competitive, and intelligent each target was. After rating all of the 
targets, participants completed a demographic questionnaire and were debriefed. 
Results 
 Table 2 shows the average warmth and competence ratings for each stereotype group 
within each cluster of the Stereotype Content Model. Four stereotype groups were identified as 
having the strongest effect within each cluster. The criteria for this identification was primarily 
highest or lowest average warmth relative to the alignment of the respective cluster (e.g., high 
warmth or low warmth) and secondarily highest or lowest average competence. Medical nurses, 
medical doctors, therapists, and astronauts showed the greatest effect (mean warmth = 3.87, 
mean competence = 4.24) for the high warmth and high competence cluster (HW&HC). 
Housewives, disabled people, blind people, and elderly people showed the greatest effect (mean 
warmth = 3.70, mean competence = 3.14) for the high warmth and low competence cluster 
(HW&LC). Politicians, wall street bankers, CEOs, and billionaires showed the greatest effect 
(mean warmth = 2.62, mean competence = 4.14) for the low warmth and high competence 
cluster (LW&HC). Drug addicts, prostitutes, alcoholics, and homeless people showed the 
greatest effect (mean warmth = 2.67, mean competence = 3.00) for the low warmth and low 
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Table 2. 
Average Warmth and Competence of all stereotype groups. 
 
Study 2: Reaction Times 
Methods 
Participants 
We conducted an a priori power analysis, assuming an effect size of d = 0.4, and 
computed the required sample size to achieve 90% power. The analysis showed a required 
sample of 60 participants, however, we elected to oversample in case of participants failing to 
complete the study. 
We recruited 97 college students (mean age = 19.14 years, SD = 1.20) from Appalachian 
State University, and compensated them with required credit for their psychology classes. Of the 
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total sample, 70 (72.16%) were female. The majority of the sample, 74 (76.29%) were 
White/Caucasian, 9 (9.28%) were African/African American, 7 (7.22%) were Asian/Asian 
American, 5 (5.52%) were Latin/Hispanic, and 2 (2.06%) were Native American. Participants 
were politically moderate (M = 3.93, SD = 1.48; 1 = very liberal; 7 = very conservative) and 68 
(70.1%) identified as religious. 
Design 
 This study was modeled on Malle & Holbrook’s (2012) methodology with the addition of 
including stereotype groups in the behavior descriptions. The study contained three fully-
crossed, within-subject factors: inference type (intentionality, desire, belief, personality), warmth 
stereotype (high/low), and competence stereotype (high/low). We counterbalanced these three 
factors using a Latin square so that each participant encountered every combination twice (once 
within each of the two blocks of 16 trials). Each block contained the same 16 stereotype groups 
so that each participant was exposed to each group twice. Additionally, across stereotype groups 
we matched the social desirability of the behaviors that targets were described as performing: 
(high warmth/high competence = 3.95, high warmth/low competence = 4.00, low warmth/high 
competence = 3.95, and low warmth/low competence = 4.00 on a 1 = very undesirable to 7 = 
very desirable scale).   
Materials 
 In this study, we only used verbal stimuli (sentences); therefore, we elected to use the 
program E-Prime to run the trials and measure reaction times. For reaction time responses, 
participants used a Serial Response Box which has a 0 millisecond debounce period and was 
made specifically to work within the E-Prime architecture. For qualitative responses to prompts, 
participants used a keyboard. 
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Procedure 
 Participants were run one at a time in a lab setting. After participants provided informed 
consent, the experimenter explained the experimental task. Participants received an instructions 
sheet which summarized the procedure. The participants read along on the sheet while the 
experimenter read the instructions out loud. These instructions described each part of the task, 
including the question ques (e.g., GOAL?) and their meanings (Did you detect the main 
character’s goal?), examples of behavior descriptions, and how to use the SR box. Once the 
participants indicated that they understood the task, they were prompted to enter the E-Prime 
program and complete four practice trials (one for each type of question que). After the practice 
trials, participants were given the option to repeat the trials if they did not understand part of the 
program interface and were asked if they had any clarifying questions.  
Afterwards, participants completed all 32 main trials in two blocks of 16 trials. The probe 
words for each trial were identical to those used by Malle and Holbrook (2012): 
INTENTIONAL? – for intentionality inferences, GOAL? – for desire inferences, THINKING? – 
for belief inferences, PERSONALITY? – for trait inferences. Participants viewed each stimuli 
sentence for 5,000 ms, identical to Malle and Holbrook’s (2012) procedure. Afterward one of the 
four inference probes would appear onscreen for 3,000 ms, during which time participants had to 
make a yes or no response on the SR Box (see Figure 3). If participants did not respond within 
the 3,000 ms, the program moved onto the next trial, and participants were reminded to try to 
answer as quickly as possible. If participants responded to a probe with a yes response, they were 
immediately asked to state their specific answer (what the content of their inference was). If 
participants responded to a probe with a no response, they were prompted to move to the next 
trial. 
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After participants completed all 32 trials, they filled out a demographics questionnaire 
and were debriefed. 
 
 
Figure 3. The sequence of events for the computer task. 
 
Results 
Likelihood of Inferences  
A within-subjects ANOVA showed a significant effect of the mental state prompt on 
participants’ ability to make an inference, F(3, 297) = 71.99, p < .001, h2 = .44. Participants 
responded yes to 77.26% (SD = 19.91) of intention prompts, 70.61% (SD = 22.65) of desire 
prompts, 47.34% (SD = 25.19) of belief prompts, and 42.02% (SD = 22.88) of personality 
prompts. Planned contrasts showed that intentionality inferences were significantly more likely 
than desire inferences (p = .008), belief inferences (p < .001), and personality inferences (p < 
.001). Desire inferences were significantly more likely than belief inferences (p < .001), and 
personality inferences (p < .001). Belief inferences, however, were as equally likely as 
personality inferences (p = .100). 
Speed of Inferences  
A within-subjects ANOVA showed a significant effect of the mental state prompt on the 
participants’ reaction times (RTs), F(3, 261) = 4.05, p = .008, h2 = .04 (See Figure 4). Consistent 
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with our predictions, participants made inferences of intentionality (MRT = 1302.05ms; SD = 
335.52) most quickly, followed by desire (MRT = 1325.69ms; SD = 396.67), belief inferences 
(MRT = 1379.36ms; SD = 436.52), and personality inferences (MRT = 1432.86ms; SD = 434.56). 
Planned contrasted showed that intentionality and desire inferences did not significantly differ 
from one another (p = .483), though intentionality inferences were significantly faster than belief 
(p = .033) and personality inferences (p = .002). Desire inferences did not significantly differ 
from belief (p = .201), but were significantly faster than personality inferences (p = .016). And 
lastly, belief and personality inferences did not significantly differ from one another (p = .277). 
 
Figure 4. Average reaction times for each type of mental state inference. 
Inferences and Stereotype Content. Warmth had no significant effect on the overall 
speed of inferences, contrary to the hypothesized outcomes, F(1, 17) = 2.01, p = .175, h2 = .106. 
Additionally, competence showed no significant effect on the overall speed of inferences, F(1, 
17) = .065, p = .802, h2 = .004. Finally, none of the two or three-way interactions were 
significant (Fs > .833, ps > .482). Table 3 shows the reaction time averages for high warmth and 
low warmth for each inference type. 
 





Reaction Time (RT) in milliseconds
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for Study 2 reaction times. 
 
General Discussion 
 The first aim of this study was to replicate the hierarchy of mental state inferences 
previously established by Malle and Holbrook (2012). The data from Study 2 mirrored their 
findings both in terms of the likelihood of mental state inferences and speed of mental state 
inferences. Whereas, our pattern of findings was not as clear cut as Malle and Holbrook (2012); 
for instance, the RT data descriptively mirror their findings, but not all of the inference types 
were significantly different from one another. Nevertheless, our data suggest the hierarchical 
structure of mental state inferences proposed by Malle and Holbrook (2012) is broadly robust 
and generalizable.  
Moreover, whereas the original studies, presented participants with generic agents (e.g., 
butcher, accountant, professor), belonging to random social groups, our study explicitly 
examined whether stereotype content for different targets moderated the speed and likelihood of 
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various mental state inferences. The present Study demonstrates that the hierarchy remains 
consistent even when explicitly manipulating warmth and competence stereotypes of the target 
groups. Essentially, the likelihood and speed of mental states inferences heavily depends on the 
kind of inference that is being made, and this effect holds regardless of who the subject of that 
inference is. The results of Study 2 support the internal and external validity of Malle and 
Holbrook’s hierarchical theory. 
 The second aim of this study was to extend Malle and Holbrook (2012) by examining if 
the stereotype membership of the subject, about which the mental state inference is being made, 
can further influence the speed of these inferences. Utilizing the Stereotype Content Model by 
Fiske and colleagues (2002), we hypothesized the perceived warmth and competence of a 
stereotype would impact the overall speed of inferences. Specifically, due to the primacy of 
warmth that has been demonstrated in previous research and its connection to evolutionary in-
group membership, we hypothesized that the higher perceived warmth of a stereotype would 
produce higher likelihoods and faster inferences than lower perceived warmth. Also, we 
hypothesized that perceived warmth would have a greater overall effect on inference likelihood 
and speed than perceived competence. The data from Study 2 showed neither warmth nor 
competence had a significant effect on the overall speed of mental state inferences. Despite the 
null statistical finding, descriptively, mental states inferences (at least of intentionality, desire 
and belief) were facilitated (i.e., faster) for targets perceived as being high in warmth compared 
to low warmth.  By contrast, variations in competence did not affect the speed of mental state 
inferences, suggesting that warmth is more fundamental (see Figure 5). However, as these effects 
did not reach standard thresholds of significance we would caution against strong inferences, and 
would argue that additional studies are needed to determine the extent that perceived warmth 
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influences mental state inferences. 
 
 
Figure 5. Effects of Warmth on Inference Speed.  
 
One possible explanation for why the stereotype effects were not significant could be the 
perceived compatibility or contradiction of agent-behavior matching. Even though SCM clusters 
were distributed evenly among behaviors of equal social desirability, some behavior stimuli may 
have been better fit to match the preconception of the stereotype group than others (e.g., “The 
redneck compares tools at the hardware store.” seems a better fit than “The alcoholic carries the 
old woman's groceries across the street.”). In the first item, the action of comparing tools 
appears to fit the schema of the redneck; however, in the second item the action of helping an 
elderly person appears to not fit the schema of an alcoholic. While each social group carries 
particular preconceptions related to warmth and competence, so does each behavior. Future 
research should aim to account for the possible relationship between social desirability and 
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support or refute the schema of that agent’s social group. 
 The way we understand mental state inferences is multifaceted. Factors such as agent-
identity, type of behavior, and the outcomes of behavior are just a few that influence our 
perception of others. When making such an inference, the brain must prioritize data and allocate 
cognitive resources to analyze the most relevant information for the inference. The more 
complex the inference, the more factors must be taken into account and therefore the longer it 
takes to make. The hierarchy of mental state inferences – intentionality, desire, belief, and 
personality trait – provides an excellent framework to understand how inference relate to each 
other. Many subsections of social cognitive research can contribute to this understanding, but 
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